Introduction
During the last two decades, capital markets around the world have experienced rapid growth and have become increasingly more integrated. These trends are reflected in the growth of domestic public bond markets and the government participation in international capital markets. At the same time, there have been many financial crises, especially in emerging markets, a phenomenon that has been partly attributed to the increase in debt burdens, particularly in foreign currency. These factors have led to a growing interest regarding the determinants of government bond market development and the currency composition of government bonds.
The literature that studies government debt markets is large, but the particular attention on government bonds is only more recent. Studies on the general determinants of governments' desire and ability to issue debt have highlighted macroeconomic stability and political economy factors.
1 The literature following the debt crisis of the early 1980s has concentrated on a country's ability to issue external debt, then mostly in 2 the form of commercial bank loans. 2 Following the Brady plan, which resolved the 1980s debt crisis by converting government debt into bonds, and as new debt took increasingly the form of international bonds, research evolved into the explanation of spreads and pricing of government bonds.
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With the financial crises in the 1990s, government bonds gained even more interest as the size and structure of government debt was identified to lead to vulnerabilities and possibly trigger financial crises.
The currency composition of government bonds has especially received much attention lately, with a number of dimensions being considered. For some countries, particularly emerging economies, borrowing in foreign currency can be less expensive than in domestic currency (or at least appear to be so). But foreign currency debt exposes governments and firms to exchange rate risk, as their revenues typically relate to local currency values. This mismatch increases the likelihood of financial crises and may make self-fulfilling runs possible (see, for example, Krugman 1999 , Jeanne 2000 , Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee 2001 , and Schneider and Tornell 2004 .
A recent empirical literature analyzes specifically the currency composition of debt and highlights the phenomenon of "original sin," defined as the inability of emerging economies to borrow abroad in their domestic currency (even short term) and to borrow long term in domestic currency in the local market (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999 , Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein 2001 , Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza 2002 , Chamon and Hausmann 2003 , and Hausmann and Panizza 2003 . This literature generally finds that a small number of institutional and macroeconomic factors 2 See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a review. 3 Perhaps the first study was Edwards (1986) , but since has evolved into a large literature mostly focusing on secondary market prices, with some studies on primary issues (e.g., Eichengreen and Mody 1998) . 4 2003). This implies that larger countries have an advantage when issuing debt in local currency, consistent with the conclusion from the original sin literature that only the size of the economy matters for the currency composition of international debt. Additionally, this literature also emphasizes that historical factors have played a significant role in helping countries overcome the original sin and that network externalities have given rise to path dependence, since a currency used in some international transactions becomes more advantageous for additional traders and investors to use. 5 This path dependence and the evidence from the original sin literature imply that there are few policy options available to many emerging countries needing to raise financing, as policymakers cannot alter initial conditions and improvements in policies and institutions do not seem to affect their ability to issue domestic currency debt.
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In this paper we reconsider the evidence. Specifically we ask: Do indeed institutional and macroeconomic factors, aside from size, not affect the development of bond markets, in particular the currency structure? To analyze this question, we study systematically whether institutional and macroeconomic factors affect the level of both domestic and foreign currency government bonds relative to GDP as well as the share of foreign currency bonds in total bonds. 7 To do so, we use a relatively long time period, 5 Flandreau and Sussman (2003) find that European countries with a large presence in international trade in the nineteenth century were able to issue bonds in domestic currency abroad, irrespective of the quality of their institutions, because there was a spot and futures market for their currencies. Therefore, they argue that overcoming original sin requires that a country emerge as a leading economic power, as exemplified by the U.S. in the nineteenth century and Japan in the twentieth century. Bordo, Meissner, and Redish (2003) analyze original sin in several former British colonies from a historical perspective and find that large shocks, such as wars and economic crises, played a significant role in overcoming this problem. 6 Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002) argue that the only way for emerging markets to escape the original sin is an international initiative to develop a market for claims denominated in an emerging market currency index, by having multilateral financial institutions and G-10 countries issuing debt denominated in this index. 7 Although these are often called sovereign bonds, we prefer to use the term government bonds to make clear that we include both central government as well as local government bonds, though most bonds in our sample are issued by central governments. factors, many of them not studied before. 8 The level of debt (especially external debt) has been identified as a significant determinant of interest rate spreads (Edwards 1986 , Eichengreen and Mody 1998 , and Min 1998 , credit ratings (Cantor and Packer 1996) , and defaults and financial crises (Rodrik and Velasco 1999 , Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001 , and Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig 2003 . On the other hand, some authors have argued that the development of a government bond market is necessary to foster the growth of a private bond market, which in turn could make countries less vulnerable to financial crises by reducing dependence on bank financing. See, for example, Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics on bond markets. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy to study the factors affecting the size and structure of government bond markets.
Section 4 shows the estimation results. Section 5 discusses the results from various robustness tests and alternative specifications. Section 6 concludes.
Data on government bonds
We are interested in explaining the size of government bond markets in domestic and foreign currency across countries, as well as the share of public bonds denominated in foreign exchange. We also want to cover the largest sample of countries and the longest time period available, comprising both domestic and international issuance, and The share of foreign currency denominated bonds over total bonds is displayed in Argentina. In Europe, transition economies also start to issue relatively more debt in 12 The small participation of emerging economies in global markets is not driven by the relatively small number of emerging economies in the sample, as we cover 12 of the largest emerging markets. For comparison, eight of these 12 countries are part of the emerging market bond index (EMBI+), compiled by J.P. Morgan, which contains a total of 19 countries. These eight countries account for 80 percent of the combined GDP of the 19 countries in the EMBI+ in 2000. Moreover, four emerging markets not part of the EMBI+ but included in our data (Chile, China, the Czech Republic, and South Korea) are all large emerging markets.
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foreign currency towards the end of the decade. The share of foreign currency bonds is the lowest for Germany and the U.S.
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The differences between developed countries and emerging markets in terms of absolute amounts and debt composition (that is, the share of foreign currency issues)
become even clearer when analyzing in more detail the structure of the global government bond market in 2000. Figure 3 shows that of the 19.1 trillion U.S. dollars in government debt outstanding among the 35 countries covered in our sample, 95 percent is on account of developed countries. The figure also shows that foreign currency issues are much more important for emerging market governments than for developed country governments, 20 percent of total bonds outstanding versus two percent in 2000. Figure 4 shows the ratio of government bond stocks relative to countries' gross domestic product (GDP).
14 Countries with higher debt ratios are mostly developed countries. This may be because these countries have stronger repayment capacity and can sustain higher debt-to-GDP ratios. Figure 5 shows the share of foreign currency claims. The figure shows the importance of foreign exchange bonds for countries like Argentina, Iceland, Russia, and Sweden, as well as for some special cases like Luxembourg, which is a major financial center for the issuance and trading of Eurobonds. 15 The figure also confirms that developed countries tend to issue more debt in their own currency, although there are exceptions.
11

Empirical methodology
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the determinants of the size and currency composition of government bond markets. The variables we want to explain are the ratio of local currency government bonds and the ratio of foreign currency bonds to GDP, while the currency choice variable is the ratio of foreign currency government bonds to total government bonds. The dependent variables are in logs. In the basic results, we estimate the relation between these three variables and a set of regressors using panel feasible generalized least squared (FGLS) estimations, allowing for heteroskedastic error structures and different autocorrelation coefficients within countries. We next specify the set of explanatory variables we use in our basic results.
We want to understand whether institutional and macroeconomic characteristics and policies affect the size and currency structure of government bonds. The literature suggests a long list of variables to use as controls in our regressions. For our first selection, we are mostly guided by the more recent literature. The basic results are reported in Table 1 . Still, we do extensive robustness tests and investigate many other variables, as reported in Section 5. The specific explanatory variables included in Table   1 (whose definitions and sources are detailed in Appendix Table 3 ) are described next.
First, we control for size. To do so, we use total GDP in nominal U.S. dollars as a proxy for the size of the economy and the potential scope for developing a (liquid) local government bond market. Second, we control for domestic financial development by using the ratio of the total deposit base in the banking system over nominal GDP, which is highly correlated with the overall development of the financial system (as shown in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2001) . This measure proxies both for the overall development of the domestic financial system and for the potential domestic demand for government securities. Though more direct measures of demand would be desirable, we were unable to find them. 16 This lack of good measures of demand calls for caution when interpreting the impact of this variable. Third, we control for the overall institutional framework by using a measure called "institutionalized democracy," which is part of the Polity IV political economy database maintained at the University of The inclusion of the exchange rate regime variable is important because it has already been associated to the currency denomination of debt. Two views exist in this respect. Proponents of hard (fixed) currency pegs argue that a strong domestic currency can provide credibility and lead to greater domestic currency financial intermediation, thereby allowing countries to issue more local currency debt over time. 17 But others argue that a fixed exchange rate increases the short-run incentives of both the government and the private sector to issue debt in foreign currency, adding to the degree of "liability dollarization." Governments with more fixed regimes may want to signal the credibility of their regime by issuing relatively more foreign currency debt. As foreign currency debt tends to be cheaper (at least in contractual terms), it is difficult to justify issuing domestic currency debt instead of less expensive foreign currency debt and, at the same time, claim that the supposedly rigid regime will persist over time. (2003) show that, in a minimum variance portfolio equilibrium, financial dollarization is explained by the relative volatilities of inflation and the real exchange rate. In this context, policies that limit exchange rate volatility, such as following a crawling peg or using monetary policy to target the nominal exchange rate, increase dollarization.
Many factors used in the literature can be subject to the criticism of being endogenous. In our particular case, contemporaneous values of inflation, fiscal burden, and the exchange rate regime can be vulnerable to this criticism. For example, countries with larger debt may be able to avoid using inflation as a means to raise revenues and finance higher expenditure levels, leading to lower scores on the inflation and fiscal burden indexes. Moreover, the degree of foreign currency liabilities can affect whether countries choose to let their currencies float; i.e., the exchange rate regime can be endogenous to the foreign currency share. This potential endogeneity of the exchange rate regime has led to the literature on "fear of floating" (Calvo and Reinhart 2002) .
Also, Devereux and Lane (2003) highlight its potential endogeneity to the structure of a country's liabilities. To try to avoid endogeneity from affecting our results, we use as much as possible institutional variables and macroeconomic indexes, which should be less sensitive to the evolution of bond markets themselves. Moreover, we use lagged and, alternatively, initial values of the potentially problematic variables, since it is difficult to find good instruments and we expect those lagged and initial values to be less affected by endogeneity concerns. In Section 5, we also report two additional estimates that try to deal with the endogeneity problem.
Regression results
The econometric results are presented in Table 1 , with each panel of the table displaying regression results for one dependent variable at a time -the log of local currency denominated bonds over GDP, the log of foreign currency denominated bonds over GDP, and the log of the share of foreign currency bonds -and using in every panel the same set of independent variables. The different columns display several specifications, depending on which exchange rate regime variable is used, and whether lagged or initial values of the potentially endogenous variables are used. The number of observations varies slightly, given that the exchange rate regime variables have different country and time coverage. Wald tests (not reported) show that the explanatory variables are always jointly significant.
The top panel with the log of local currency bonds over GDP as the dependent variable shows that countries with bigger economies have relatively larger local currency government bond markets. This result is very robust and holds across specifications.
This suggests that scale effects exist in the development of local government bond markets. These economies of scale may exist in the development of the infrastructure of local bond markets, including incurring the fixed costs of establishing clearing and settlement systems and developing the legal framework for issuing and trading. Also, it is very likely that scale effects exist in the liquidity of secondary markets for bonds.
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Regarding the development of the financial system, as proxied by the relative size of the banking system, we find that countries with more developed systems have more developed bond markets. This result is very robust and holds across all specifications.
This result may indicate that countries with a more developed financial system have more demand for government bonds. The specific significance of the banking deposit variable might reflect the fact that deposit-taking banks directly invest in government paper as well as that a more developed banking system is associated with a larger institutional investor base. In addition, a more developed banking system may create demand for government securities among the general public through better developed distribution channels, possibly including the presence of a primary dealers network, which may indirectly increase investors' interest in buying bonds, also because of more liquid secondary markets. Of course, a more developed financial system is also often characterized by a more developed bond market, so it need not be a greater demand what explains the positive coefficient.
We now turn to the other institutional and macroeconomic indicators. A robust result across almost all specifications is the sign of the institutional development variable.
Specifically, countries with good, more democratic institutions have larger government bond markets relative to their GDP. This suggests that good institutions and democracy are important in the eyes of investors, maybe as they are associated with a greater credibility of the state, better quality of decision making, and an easier acceptance by the public of policies, including macroeconomic policies. This finding confirms evidence from Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett (1995) , Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) , and many others regarding the role of institutions in determining the quality of (macro) economic management. In a narrower sense, that is, for the development of bond markets specifically, it may be that more effective constraints on a country's executive reduce the (perceived) risks of default on government debt, including debt dilution through inflation spikes. A supply-related explanation can be that more democratic countries "desire" (and can sustain) a greater role of the government in their economies, including providing different forms of social insurance (such as unemployment and pension benefits), leading to higher fiscal expenditures as well as larger debt.
In terms of monetary policies, we find that lower inflation rates are associated with larger local currency government bond markets. This is to be expected since lower inflation rates tend to be associated with lower volatilities of inflation and, consequently, a lower tendency for governments to inflate away the outstanding debt, thus making local currency debt less risky. 19 Another interpretation of this result is that governments with high inflation do not need to issue large amounts of debt, as the inflation tax is a major source of government revenue. Regarding fiscal policies, we find that larger government expenditure helps sustain larger bond markets. A general larger role of the government, 18 including presumably the ability of the government to tax the economy more (easily) may thus affect the willingness of investors to finance the government as well as affect the desire of governments to issue debt. The significance of the larger fiscal expenditure could also reflect an underlying desire of citizens for a larger distributive role of the government, both within a given period through larger expenditures, and between generations and over time through larger deficits and higher debt stocks. Still, this result has to be interpreted with some caution since the variable becomes insignificant when using initial values (columns 5 and 6).
Finally, the three exchange rate regimes variables are mostly significant and have a positive sign. In other words, countries with a more flexible exchange rate regime (de jure or de facto) tend to have larger local currency bond markets. On the demand side, investors in bonds of countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes might be less fearful of sharp currency depreciations and of large inflation spikes that can decrease the real value of their investments. And on the supply side, governments with more flexible exchange rates might finance themselves more through local currency bonds as they have less desire to signal a commitment to a foreign exchange regime by issuing foreign currency bonds.
The middle panel presents the results for the log of foreign currency bonds over GDP. Contrary to the case of domestic currency bonds, the log of GDP variable has a negative coefficient in all specifications. This result is very robust and the variable is statistically significant in all specifications. This result reinforces the scale effect described above, in the sense that having a smaller domestic economy may make it more attractive for governments to issue in foreign currency to meet their financing needs.
This result is in line with the pattern of Figure 2 , where smaller, mostly emerging economies tend to issue more debt in foreign currency. The coefficient on total deposits to GDP is negative in this regression, that is, a relatively better developed financial system decreases the amount of debt issued in foreign currency, the opposite sign from the regression results for the local currency bond variable. The variable is also significant in all specifications.
The other institutional and macroeconomic variables also affect the size of foreign currency bond markets. However, in contrast to the size of the economy and financial system development variables, these factors tend to affect foreign currency bonds in the same direction that they affect domestic currency bonds. Countries with good democratic institutions have larger foreign currency bond markets, suggesting that investors are more willing to buy bonds when governments are more legitimate and policies more credible.
Although not always statistically significant, higher inflation is associated with a smaller stock of foreign currency bonds relative to GDP. In some sense, this result may be surprising because inflation can be expected to primarily affect the amount of local currency bonds. But, high inflation is also typically associated with macroeconomic instability and occasionally with general government defaults, what might explain the lower demand among investors for both domestic and foreign currency bonds. Also, as before, when significant, the fiscal burden variable is positively correlated with foreign currency bonds. The negative signs for the variables that capture the actual exchange rate regime suggest that countries with de-facto less flexible exchange rate regimes have larger foreign currency bond markets relative to GDP. This result is consistent with some 20 of the predictions discussed above, in the sense that exchange rate rigidity prompts governments to issue more debt in foreign currency.
The bottom panel presents the results for the variable foreign currency bonds over total bonds, i.e., the share of foreign exchange borrowings. To some degree, these results can already be inferred from the two previous panels, especially when the explanatory The variable institutionalized democracy is statistically significant and positive in all specifications, suggesting that investors in foreign currency bonds value more than investors in domestic currency bonds the fact that governments are legitimate and policies more credible. A higher inflation index is associated with a lower share of foreign currency debt. The coefficient on the fiscal burden variable is positive, implying that countries with a higher fiscal burden can or want to issue a higher proportion of foreign currency debt. Though the official exchange rate regime is positively associated with the share of foreign currency debt, the two indicators for the actual exchange rate regime, the more meaningful variables, are negatively and statistically significant associated with the share. In other words, governments from countries that de facto follow a more fixed exchange rate regime tend to have a higher proportion of foreign currency debt, as various papers predict. The differences between using de jure and de 21 facto classifications of exchange rate regimes highlight the disparity between these classifications and suggest that it is important to analyze the effects of de facto measures.
Alternative specifications
In this section, we discuss the results of estimating a number of alternative specifications to study to what extent institutional and macroeconomic factors matter when we depart from the estimations reported above. Namely, we conduct these estimations to test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of other variables and to changes in the estimation techniques. These estimations also help us analyze the effects of introducing variables omitted in the above regressions. Since we estimated a very large number of alternative specifications, we are unable to report all of them in the paper. We chose to report a set of estimations that we consider particularly interesting.
We comment on the other results we obtained at the end of this section; those results are available upon request. The bottom line from this exercise is that institutional and macroeconomic factors are still important in explaining the size and currency composition of government bond markets, even when varying significantly the basic framework presented in Section 4. We turn to the description of the results next.
First, we consider whether the specific proxy we used for the country's financial sector development affects our results. In addition to the banking system variable (total deposits over GDP), we therefore also include in the regressions the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (in logs). Second, to proxy for foreign investors' interest in the country, we include the variable log of international claims over GDP as an additional independent variable. One drawback with this variable is that it much reduces the number of countries in the sample, which is why we did not report these results in the previous section. Another drawback is that it is not a perfect proxy for the demand of foreign investors. Table 2 displays the results with these two new independent variables for all the three dependent variables; results are shown with lagged values of the independent variables, but using initial values leads to similar conclusions.
The variable stock market capitalization has a positive coefficient in the regressions that use local currency bonds over GDP as dependent variable (just as the total deposits variable does), suggesting that the specific measure for financial sector development does not drive our results. Furthermore, the total deposits variable remains significant and positive, suggesting that the development of both the banking system and the stock market are related to domestic currency bond market development. For the regressions that use foreign currency bonds over GDP as dependent variable, the stock market capitalization variable is not significant, whereas for the ratio of foreign currency to total bonds the coefficient is significant and negative in one regression. Again, the deposit variable keeps its sign and remains statistically significant for all dependent variables.
The variable international claims over GDP has a negative sign in the regressions that use local currency bonds over GDP as dependent variable, while, when significant, it has a positive sign in the regressions that use foreign currency bonds, both over GDP and as a share of total outstanding bonds. In other words, more international claims (which could be a proxy for international demand of domestic instruments) is negatively related to the amount of local currency bonds, while is positively related to the amount of foreign currency bonds. Interestingly, these signs are opposite to the ones displayed by the 23 domestic financial system development variables (banking system deposits and stock market capitalization over GDP), suggesting that domestic investors tend to purchase bonds in domestic currency, while international investors demand more bonds in foreign currency. While this supports much casual observation, most portfolio allocation models imply that investors should spread their investment over various currencies. As such, these relationships may be due to a form of home bias in that investors prefer instruments denominated in their own currency.
Second, we investigate whether our choice of institutional variables affects the results. We explore specifically whether controlling for the general degree of development, the origin of the country's legal system, and the degree of capital account openness affects our previous results. We also study the significance of these variables.
One can expect that more developed countries have better institutions and, consequently, have more developed bond markets. Furthermore, GDP per capita is the broadest measure of countries' overall level of development and would thus capture any omitted missing variables. Legal origin has been found to be an important factor in financial sector development, with English legal origin countries generally displaying deeper financial markets (La Porta et al. 1997) . Capital account openness can be expected to influence not only foreign investor demand, since they may otherwise not be able to access the market, but also that of domestic investors as it allows them to invest abroad.
At the same time, the degree of openness can be an important signal as to the country's own macroeconomic policies, with more closed economies being less subject to market discipline, making domestic investors perhaps less interested in bonds. Table 3 reports the regression results. We find that countries' general level of development, as proxied by GDP per capita, is actually statistically significant and negatively related to the size of their domestic currency bond markets, and significant in one specification for each of the other two dependent variables (columns 1 and 2). This somewhat surprising result may in part be due to the fact that we already control in the regression for a number of country factors⎯GDP, institutionalized democracy, inflation, and fiscal policy. But importantly, the coefficients on these and other country variables remain the same as above. This suggests that the relations found so far are not likely driven by some relevant omitted country characteristics.
As documented by others, we confirm that countries with English legal origin have relatively larger bond markets (Table 3 , columns 3 and 4). English legal origin countries have more developed domestic and foreign currency bond markets, suggesting that the fact that a country has an English legal origin provides some comfort to investors, perhaps as its legal system is more respectful of investors' property rights and might treat investors better in case of default. In relative terms though, the legal origin is more important for the domestic currency bond markets as the sign of the coefficient for the share of foreign currency bonds is negative, although statistically significant in only one of the two specifications. Again, the coefficients for the other variables remain the same as above.
Regarding capital account openness, we use the variable constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002) . The results suggest that more open countries have less developed domestic currency bond markets but have larger foreign currency bond markets (Table 3, columns 5 and 6). This is consistent with domestic investors being less restricted in their asset allocation under an open capital account and no financial restrictions, leading them to demand less domestic currency debt. Similarly, foreign investors are more likely to invest in a country's bonds when its financial market is open; but they tend to do so by purchasing foreign currency bonds. In terms of the share of foreign exchange bonds, the sign on the capital account openness variable is then also positive (and statistically significant so). Also in these specifications, the coefficients for the other variables remain the same as above.
Third, our results so far suggest that there are some economies of scale in the development of bond markets as the sign for the coefficient on the size of the economy (log of GDP) is consistently positive in the domestic currency bond market regressions and negative in the foreign currency bond market regressions. We now explore whether there are some non-linear effects, i.e., whether the tendency to use foreign currency bonds depends on the economic size. The idea is that it might be difficult for very small countries to borrow in foreign currency, for example because investors do not want to invest resources in analyzing the prospects of the country. Since this is an empirical question, we tested whether the relation is hump-shaped by including a quadratic term.
The results of the non-linear effects of size are reported in Table 4 . We do find some support for an inverted U-shape relation, as the sign for the log of GDP is positive for foreign exchange bonds both as a ratio of GDP and as a share of total government bonds, while the sign for the square of log of GDP is negative. All other country variables remain of the same sign and significance as above, confirming the robustness of our results on the importance of institutional and macroeconomic factors.
Fourth, another concern might be that use of the inflation index from the Heritage Foundation rather than the inflation rate itself affects our results. We therefore also tried different measures of inflation. We report results with the average past inflation over a three-year period in Table 5 . All the results using this measure instead of the index are consistent with those using the index variable, except for domestic currency bonds, where the average inflation is not statistically significant.
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The coefficients for all other variables have the same sign and significance as above, confirming again the robustness of the results.
Fifth, we analyze in greater detail the possibility of endogeneity of some of our variables to the structure of a country's liabilities. We concentrate especially on the exchange rate regime, but we also consider the potential endogeneity of inflation and fiscal burden. We have dealt with this problem to some extent by using lagged dependent variables and initial values. We now do so by using instrumental variable regressions that try to account for potential endogeneity. Table 6 reports the results, where the first column repeats the earlier regression results without using the exchange rate regime to see whether its inclusion biases the other results. We find that the above results are unaltered. Then, we instrument the actual exchange regime in two regressions (columns 2 and 3) and the exchange rate regime, the inflation index, and the fiscal burden in two other regressions (columns 4 and 5). Since it is difficult to find good instruments, we use as instruments lagged values of these variables, where the instruments vary across 20 We also found some evidence that it matters whether countries cross certain levels of inflation, and not necessarily the level of inflation per se. This is consistent with the results previously reported by Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) , who find that the relation between inflation and financial development is characterized by the existence of thresholds. Perhaps, that might explain why the index works well, since it ranks countries in five categories, rather than as a continuous variable.
specifications. Our results that institutional and macroeconomic variables matter hold in the same manner as above: countries with less flexible exchange regimes have relative more use of foreign currency bonds, lower inflation and higher fiscal burden are related to greater domestic and foreign currency bond markets. Although it is difficult to be completely certain that the endogeneity problem is fully resolved, these results further confirm our main findings.
Finally, we tested (but not report here) the importance of many other variables.
These tests included the share of the population over 65 to account for pension expenditures, the use of variables scaled by the U.S. inflation, measures of U.S. T-bill yields, growth rates in the U.S., G-3, and G-7 countries, measures related to interest rate parity conditions, exclusion of the financial development variables, and exclusion of the inflation variable. Furthermore, we used the level of foreign currency reserves over GDP to control, to some degree, for the ability of governments to repay outstanding bonds.
We also used interaction terms between the variables of interest and a dummy for developed countries to test whether the effects of the explanatory variables differ across developed and developing countries. Again, the inclusion of those variables does not affect significantly our basic results and, in many cases, the new variables included are statistically significant.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the factors that facilitate governments to issue debt in domestic and foreign currency in light of the limited ability of developing countries to issue claims in their own currency and the current debate on original sin. While we 28 confirm some of current thinking regarding the factors that facilitate governments to issue debt in different currencies, we shed much new light on the issue. In particular, we confirm that economies that are smaller tend to have smaller domestic currency bond markets but have larger amounts of bond financing in foreign currency. We show, however, that besides the size of the economy, a number of institutional and macroeconomic factors do affect the development of local currency bond markets and the use of foreign currency ones.
Economies that have less developed domestic financial systems tend to have relatively smaller amounts of bond financing in domestic currency, while larger foreign claims on the country's assets are associated with more foreign currency bonds. The level of inflation, democratic institutions restricting government actions, countries' legal orientation, fiscal burden, financial liberalization, and other institutional variables also affect the degree of domestic currency bond market development and the use of foreign currency bonds. Importantly, we find that countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes have relatively more foreign currency financing. This relation may be because of incentives in place, such as moral hazard considerations arising from an international bailout, or because governments try to bind themselves to a higher commitment on macroeconomic management.
Our findings have several implications for the current discussions on the feasibility of developing domestic currency bond markets, especially for reducing exposure to foreign exchange risk for emerging markets. The result that smaller economies tend to issue more foreign currency denominated bonds suggests some scale effects in the development of local currency bond markets, perhaps due to the fixed costs 29 of establishing the infrastructure or because of externalities in liquidity. This implies that there may be some limits to the development of local bond markets in domestic currency, especially for small economies. The findings also highlight the importance of the role of the overall domestic financial system in developing bond markets. Specifically, a well developed financial system with a relatively large pool of domestic investors may help to develop local currency debt markets, given that domestic investors are the ones that tend to demand domestic currency debt. And since foreign investors mostly demand foreign currency debt, issuing domestic currency debt in international markets remains difficult, though not impossible. In that sense, as many countries are small and have limited domestic investor bases, they have little choice but to issue foreign currency claims to foreign investors and incur the associated higher exchange rate risk.
Our results also suggest that policies matter. The fact that more flexible regimes can support a greater share of domestic currency bonds is consistent with the claim that more rigid exchange rate regimes generate incentives, not only for the private sector, but also for the government to borrow in foreign currency, exposing countries to more foreign exchange risk. This implies that, in terms of risks, the exchange rate regime is important as it affects the incentives to continue to borrow in foreign currency. More generally, the policy implication of our results is that the whole institutional and macroeconomic structure, including not only the exchange rate regime but also the monetary, financial, and fiscal stance, can determine the degree of risk taking of a country. In that respect, the very recent experiences with Chile, Colombia, and Mexico actively issuing domestic currency bonds in domestic and international capital markets might offer some hope for other emerging economies with high degree of dollarization.
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In these recent experiences, macroeconomic fundamentals appear to have played an important role in enabling access to domestic currency financing.
While this paper has provided inputs into the analysis of government bond markets, many issues remain open for future research. On the methodology front, research can continue to investigate whether good instruments exist to test and control for potential endogeneity. We tried to address this issue by, among other things, using lags
and initial values and instrumental variables regressions, but it is still possible that we have not been fully successful in addressing this problem. Moreover, it would be interesting to analyze why our results are different from those of the original sin literature. Perhaps, the inclusion by that literature of many other countries with little or no bond market activity explains those differences. Also, it would be useful to study to what extent supply-and demand-side factors drive our results. Finally, it would be interesting to find better measures of domestic and foreign investors demand and see how they affect the debt currency structure. Our results suggest that the domestic investor base, not the foreign one, is very important to develop domestic currency bond markets and help countries move out of the original sin, but more research is needed on this front.
Figure 1
This figure shows the evolution over time of the amount outstanding of government bonds issued by the public sector in billions of U.S. dollars. Bonds are issued in local and foreign currencies in domestic, foreign, and Eurobond markets.
Evolution of Government Bond Markets
This figure shows the evolution over time of the share of foreign currency denominated bonds over the total amount outstanding of bonds issued by the public sector. The values are constructed from country averages and divided in developed countries and emerging markets. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) This table shows regressions estimated through FGLS with heteroskedastic error structures and autocorrelation within countries. The data cover 35 countries between 1993 and 2000. Inflation index, fiscal burden, and the two exchange rate regimes are lagged one period. See Appendix Table 3 for the definition of the variables. Absolute values for z-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
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This table shows regressions estimated through FGLS with heteroskedastic error structures and autocorrelation within countries. The data cover 35 countries between 1993 and 2000. In columns (2) and (3) the actual exchange rate regime is estimated from OLS regressions, using the macroeconomic and institutional variables and its own lags as regressors. In columns (4) and (5) the actual exchange rate regime, inflation index, and fiscal burden are estimated from OLS regressions, using the macroeconomic and institutional variables and their own lags as regressors. Since these variables are generated regressors in the FGLS regressions, the estimates of the standard errors may be biased. However, under the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are zero, the standard errors are unbiased. Therefore, the t-statistic for the null hypothesis is not invalidated (Pagan 1984) . Inflation index and fiscal burden are lagged one period. See Appendix Table 3 for the definition of the variables. Absolute values for z-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively.
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